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on such issues as national treatment, dispute settlement and abolition of perfor-
mance requirements, the United States itself and other developed countries had 
begun to rethink their own principles. We see, in the European Community and 
the United States, hints of a resurgent economic nationalism, for example, through 
the beginnings of legislation that would draw distinctions between how companies 
are treated based on the nationality of the ownership of the capital stock. So, 
while the United States and other developed countries have been successful in 
moving the developing world more toward their position, I think international 
lawyers and scholars need to be alert to whether or not the United States is perhaps 
moving in the other direction. 
We have had an interesting four or five years in the development of international 
economic law. The developments are bound to continue, as a number of the Asian 
nations become more active in international affairs, as the global community be-
gins to feel the full impact of the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, and as 
we begin to look to Latin America for leadership, as it works through many of 
these issues. 
THE NEW NEW INrERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
By Helen Elizabeth Hartnell* 
During this decade of international law , we are challenged to reflect on the role 
oflaw in shaping international relations, and then to set our course for the coming 
years. Today, we are called upon to consider the changes since December 1974, 
when a resolution incorporating the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States was adopted by the UN General Assembly. I That controversial Charter 
embodied a starkly bipolar view of the world that divided North from South, 
developed from developing, and posited that the tension between these poles, "if 
not properly checked, would [aounteract the tendencies toward integration and 
interdependence and] lead to the disintegration of the world community."2 
One of our crosscutting themes this week is "Our Changing Sense of Commu-
nity." We are told that, since the end of the Cold War, we no longer live in a 
bipolar world. It is true that the end of the East-West conflict has removed one 
set of divisions.3 Yet, we are still spread along various spectra that color our 
perceptions. The gap remains between developed and developing, between inves-
tor and host, even while the wealthiest countries are beset with worries and the 
strongest economies stumble. It is an unfortunate irony that though our circum-
stances are de facto closer than ever in these hard times, we tend to focus on our 
* Faculty of Law, Central European University, Budapest; Civic Education Project Instructor, 
Eotvos Lorand (ELTE) University. 
I Report of the Second Committee, UN Doc.Al9946, 28 (Dec. 9, 1974); UN Doc.AlRes/328t (XXIX) 
(Jan. 15, 1975); reprinted in 14 ILM 251. The roll-call vote was 120 in favor, 6 opposed (Belgium, 
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States), and 10 abstentions (Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Norway, and Spain). 
2 Speech of Emilio O. Rabasa, Secretary of Foreign Relations of Mexico, 68 ASIL PROC. 302 
(1975). 
3 In one sense, then, the CentralfEast European countries are now free to join the rest of the 
developing world, and to "[comprehend] the principles of the self-reliance of the individual which 
implies misery, homeless ness or starvation as penalty for failure." Czeslaw Milosz, Central Ellropean 
Attitudes, 5 CROSS CURRENTS 101, 104 (1986). See also K. J. Zaleska, Local Cllitural Responses to 
Multinationals, in 1 NATIONALISM NOTES 23 (November 1992). 
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differences rather than our similarities in the struggle to survive. This natural 
tendency to cling to differences also serves as a means to preserve identity in the 
face of globalization, particularly in those countries where not everyone is able 
successfully to enjoy the material benefits and assimilate the ideological values 
of the new global high culture.4 So while we surely must embrace this new opportu-
nity to converge with countries now emerging from decades of isolation, the re-
vival of ardent nationalism reminds us not to congratulate ourselves too heartily. 
The failed Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, like the failed 
Soviet Union, was built by "levellers."5 Their failure is rooted in the inevitability 
of diversity. Today's scrambling toward political, economic and legal integration 
in the eastern and western hemispheres might be seen to stem from fear of the 
consequences of too much difference, or from a recognition that cooperation can 
erase destructive differences. In any case, integration always has its limits; some-
thing is always held back. That "something" held back-the domaine reserve-is 
another of our crosscutting themes this week. 
The domaine reserve, a key feature of the international legal system, denotes 
the point at which differences begin to overshadow common values and interests. 
One need not look far to discover attempts to define the boundary between "us" 
and "them," between particular and universal, and between national/state auton-
omy/sovereignty and globalization. This phenomenon may be observed in two 
familiar contexts. First, a pervasive tension exists in countries consisting offedera-
tions of states (such as the United States) and other confederations (such as the 
European Community) concerning the extent of legislative (that is, prescriptive) 
jurisdiction possessed by the central authorities. The meaning of "federalism" in 
the United States has yet to be settled once and for all, and the debates in the 
Ee surrounding the Maastricht Treaty on European Union and the doctrine of 
subsidiarity6 are unlikely to subside soon. Secondly, even states that have by 
treaty agreed to submit to certain common rules generally leave an avenue of 
escape from the international regime they have helped to create. Most often, such 
exceptions are based on vague notions of "public policy" or related doctrines. 
In either case, the concept of domaine reserve implies an identity that needs to 
be preserved by a process of differentiation. 
Not only are differences inevitable; they are desirable, up to a point. Indeed, 
the notion of competitive advantage is the foundation of the international trading 
regime. The famous example from the experience of the EC simply invokes 
"bread, beer and cheese" as proof of the desirability of preserving local differ-
ences. Diversity may also be desirable within a federal system, if one believes 
that the states should "serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment," 
and must therefore be "free to engage in any activity that their citizens choose 
for the common weal, no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else ... 
deems state involvement to be."7 These few examples are only meant to suggest, 
but not to exhaust the variety of political, cultural and economic factors that are 
implicated. 
4 See Gabriela Apostol. 1 NATIONALISM NOTES 18, 19: (Globalization can be viewed as "penetration 
of capitalist market forces ... or in terms of cultural homogenization through the world-wide spreading 
of certain consumer goods and values"). 
~ See Czeslaw Milosz. citing Stanislaw Witkiewicz, supra note 4, at 105-06. 
h See, e.g .. Nicholas Emiliou. Subsidiarity: An Effective Barrier Against "the Enterprises of Ambi-
tion"?, 17 EUR. L. REV. 383 (1992). 
7 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985) (Blackmun, J.) (citing 
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann. 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting». 
464 ASIL Proceedings, 1993 
According to Carlos Fuentes, the Mexican author, the "universal question of 
the coming century" is, "How do we deal with the 'Other'?"8 This is as true in 
law as in other fields. It would be preaching to the converted to argue here that 
some of the problems we face call increasingly for regional or global solutions. 
Yet our enthusiasm for international cooperation must be tempered by respect 
for the integrity of that which cannot be compromised. Our task, then, is to enunci-
ate criteria for determining when and what sort of common rules are desirable, 
and conversely, to consider how to define those areas in which, and the methods 
by which, differences must be preserved. The extent to which "national govern-
ments should . . . be required to relinquish their ability to influence events or 
institutions in a way that suits national culture" has aptly been called the "true 
international federalism issue."9 
Private International Law 
The domain of international law has expanded to encompass matters tradition-
ally thought to be within domestic jurisdiction via private international law (PIL) 
conventions and related phenomena. I wish to refer broadly to the unification 
and harmonization of legal rules and procedures governing the relations between 
private parties. This is by no means a new phenomenon; it is not only going strong, 
but growing stronger. My goal today is not to survey current developments in this 
field so much as to reflect upon some pervasive themes. 
The nature of PIL work is varied and depends partly upon the character of the 
institution engaged in unifying or harmonizing the law. At the low end of the 
spectrum are standard definitions lO and contracts I I for use in international trade. 
Such texts are often said to represent mere codifications of mercantile practice. 
In any event, standard terms or contracts do not have the force of law per se; 
they govern a transaction only if the parties have chosen to incorporate them into 
their agreement. The high end of the spectrum is inhabited by PIL conventions 
that set forth legal rules to govern choice of law, procedural or substantive issues 
within their scope. Let us consider these issues in turn. 
Efforts to unify choice of law norms enjoy a long history, but only modest 
success. Most efforts in this field have been undertaken by the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law, which is celebrating its centennial anniversary in 
1993. Neither the Hague Conference Convention on the Law Applicable to Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods (1985), nor those on the Law Applicable 
to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons and on the Law Applicable to 
Trusts and on their Recognition, have been widely adopted, although the latter 
are being considered for ratification in the United States. And despite the lack of 
enthusiasm usually generated within the United States by conventions of this kind, 
the Organization of American States (OAS) proposes to conclude a convention 
containing choice-of-Iaw rules for certain contracts at its next intergovernmental 
PIL conference (CIDIP-V) in 1994. Within the European Community, the Rome 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations provides the frame-
work for analyzing all contractual choice-of-Iaw questions that come before the 
courts of EC member states. 
Efforts to unify procedural and substantive rules have been more fruitful on 
8254 NATION 410 (1992). 
9 JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELA. 
TlONS 1242 (2d ed. 1986). 
10 E.g., the INCOTERMS prepared by the International Chamber of Commerce. 
II E.g., those prepared by the Economic Commission for Europe. 
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the whole than efforts to unify choice-of-Iaw rules. Notable examples in the area 
of procedure include the Hague Conference Conventions on the Service Abroad 
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters and on 
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters. The OAS is 
also active in the procedural field. 12 Most civil litigation in Western Europe is 
covered by the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and the 1988 Lugano Convention that 
extended the framework established for EC member states to the countries of the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA). And now the Hague Conference, prompted by 
the United States, is considering whether to prepare ajurisdiction and judgments 
convention for worldwide adoption. 
The tireless drive to increase predictability and remove impediments to interna-
tional trade by way of unifying substantive norms received some impetus from 
the successful conclusion and wide adoption of the Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods (CISG) prepared by the UN Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law (UNCITRAL).13 For example, conventions providing uniform 
norms to govern international factoring and financial leasing transactions were 
prepared by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNI-
DROIT) and are being considered for ratification in the United States and elsewhere. 
The UNCITRAL Conventions on International Bills of Exchange and International 
Promissory Notes, on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, 
and on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals are also being considered 
for ratification. And, within the European Community, efforts to unify some areas 
of substantive law of the member states via regulations persist. 14 
Between these poles, various alternative PIL devices proliferate. Where once 
the pendulum swung away from voluntary toward compUlsory measures (which 
might or might not yield to party autonomy), and away from unification of choice-
of-law rules toward more comprehensive unification of substantive norms, we are 
now witnessing a course correction. It is ironic that UNCITRAL, which has achieved 
the greatest success so far in terms of formal unification of substantive law, has 
been the one to shift its focus away from binding normative systems toward "soft 
law," such as nonbinding legal guides (for example, on contracts for the construc-
tion of industrial works and on countertrade) and model laws (for example, on 
bank guarantees and standby letters of credit, on procurement, and on interna-
tional credit transfers). UNIDROIT, on the other hand, continues its eclectic ap-
proach to PIL work, balancing efforts to prepare conventions on substantive issues 
(for example. protection of cultural property and security interests in mobile equip-
ment) and conflict oflaw issues (for example, law applicable to international credit 
transfers), with efforts to complete drafting nonbinding General Principles for 
International Commercial Contracts. In contrast, the work of the Hague Confer-
ence and the OAS continues, in the traditional vein, to focus on binding conven-
tions that regulate assorted procedural and choice-of-Iaw issues. 
The retreat from formal unification of substantive law is most apparent within 
12 For example, it has concluded Inter-American Conventions on International Commercial Arbitra-
tlon, on Letters Rogatory, on Taking Evidence Abroad. and on the International Return of Minors. 
13 One reason for the success of the CISG vis-ii-vis earlier efforts to promote international rules 
for the sale of goods is that UNCITRAL is more inclusive than the traditional Eurocentric approaches 
toward uniform substantive law. 
14 See, e.g .. Amended Proposal for a regulation on the Statute for a European company, 1991 O.l. 
(C 176), at 9. 
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the EC, and changing European attitudes are spilling over from the regional cup 
into the global bowl. Yet, this shift indicates, not that the "obstinate apostle[s] 
of the unified market" 15 are on the run, but rather that they have altered their 
tactics. The European Court's 1979 Cassis de Dijon decision l6 establishing the 
principle of mutual recognition later became the linchpin of the Commission's 
"new approach" to harmonization initiated by its 1985 White Paper on Completing 
the Internal Market. 17 The combined emphasis on "home country control" and 
mutual recognition "implicitly recognizes competition between legal orders as a 
substitute for harmonization. "18 
A further aspect of the EC's modern approach to integration is a stated prefer-
ence for harmonization (via directives) over unification (via regulations). 19 The 
term' 'harmonization" is used here to refer to measures that fall short of normative 
unification, measures that instead constitute an approximation (rapprochement 
or Angleichung) of rules or a coordination ofpolicies.2° This movement is calcu-
lated to "allow greater latitude to participating States in the articulation of norms, 
while still ensuring uniformity in the results of their application" and may be 
referred to as "the unification of objectives. "21 Implicit in harmonization is a 
recognition of the necessity and even the desirability of accommodating differ-
ences.22 Such harmonization is being carried out, not only within the framework 
of the EC itself, pursuant to Articles 100, 100A and 235 of the Treaty of Rome; 
it is also spreading de jure to certain EFTA countries (pursuant to the European 
Economic Area Agreement). In addition, the reach of EC harmonizing directives 
is extending into Central and Eastern Europe, pursuant to the EC's network of 
association and cooperation agreements. For example, Article 69 of the 1991 Eu-
rope Agreement between Hungary and the EC requires Hungary to approximate 
its legislation to that of the EC "as far as possible" in all major areas of economic 
law.23 
IS See Julian Currall, Some Aspects of the Relation between Articles 30-36 and Article 100 of the 
EEC Treaty, with a Closer Look at Optional Harmonisation, 4 Y.B. EUR. L. 169, 179 (1985). 
16 REWE, case 120m, [1979] ECR 649. 
17 COM 310 final (14 June 1985). 
18 See Norbert Reich, Competition Between Legal Orders: A New Paradigm of EC Law?, 29 COM. 
MON MKT. L. REV. 861 (1992). 
19 See Daniel Vignes, The Harmonisation of National Legislation and the EEC, 15 EUR. L. REV. 
358 (1990). See also Martin Boodman, The Myth Of Harmonization Of Laws, 39 AM. J. COMPo L. 
699, 718 (1991). ("The arguments in favor of harmonization of laws generally ... based on certainty 
in the law ... raise serious issues oflegal and political theory regarding hermeneutics, legal reasoning 
and the role of precedent, as well as the role of formal systems of law in states and society. These 
issues are not addressed in any detail in the literature regarding harmonization of laws and . • . are 
unresolved. "). 
20 H. P. Glenn, Harmonization of Private Law Rules Between Civil and Common Law Jurisdictions: 
General Report, XIIIth INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1,3 (Montreal, 1990). Harmo-
nization may be formal (Le., achieved via bilateral or multilateral institutional efforts) or informal. 
21 Glenn, supra note 20, at 4. See also H. Duintjer Tebbens, Private International Law and the 
Single European Market: Coexistence or Cohabitation?, in UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM, FORTY YEARS 
ON: THE EVOLUTION OF POSTWAR PIL IN EUROPE 49 (1990) (observing the expanding range of private 
law matters covered by harmonizing directives in recent years). 
22 Compare Glenn, supra note 20, at 2 ("Harmonization, if it is said to exist, must ... accommodate 
and encadre disagreement.") with Boodman, supra note 19, at 718 (suggestion that there must be a 
market for laws in order to justify harmonization). 
23 E.g., customs law, company law, banking law, company accounts and taxes, intellectual property, 
protection of workers at the workplace, financial services, rules on competition, protection of health 
and life of humans, animals and plants, food legislation, consumer protection (including product liabil-
ity), indirect taxation, technical rules and standards, transport and the environment. 
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Although harmonization is largely a European phenomenon,24 it ought neverthe-
less to be understood in the context of the overall reevaluation of the usefulness 
of traditional PIL devices. The grounds for the retreat from formal unification of 
substantive norms are many, not least of which is the realization that European 
"economic integration need not be accompanied by a single legal space, not even 
in those parts of the law that have a direct bearing upon the free movement of 
persons, goods, services and capital within the Community," since "a unified 
market can perfectly co-exist with a plurality of legal systems,"25 such as in the 
United States. Complete uniformity, in other words, is unnecessary. 
In a broader sense, the "shift away from standardization results from a realiza-
tion that true uniformity of laws among sovereign jurisdictions is a doubtful, if 
not impossible, goal. "26 The retreat thus also reflects acceptance of both the 
political untenability of uniformity and the inevitability of the conflict of laws. 
The existence of binding uniform substantive norms may reduce, but cannot elimi-
nate, the occasional need to resort to conflict-of-Iaws analysis, unless the legal 
system created is an autonomous one. Code-minded civil law scholars have made 
recent attempts in this direction, for example by urging that gaps in uniform sub-
stantive laws should be filled by resort to "general principles" rather than to the 
law of a nationaljurisdiction.27 On the whole, however, these efforts have failed, 
and we are left with even more complex conflict-of-Iaws problems than we had 
before, owing both to the nature of the questions that arise under a PIL convention 
and the quantity thereof that result from the proliferation of fragmentary enact-
ments. 28 
A crucial factor in the analysis of whether to pursue the conclusion of binding 
uniform substantive norms is their value per se. Trenchant criticism abounds. 
First, a convention that lacks a mechanism to facilitate ongoing revision in order 
to adjust to changing circumstances would soon become a "fossil. "29 Secondly, 
the compromises inevitable during the consensus-seeking process may tend to 
unify norms at the level of the "lowest common denominator." Thirdly, uniform 
norms might be viewed as grey flannel products of the abstract rationalist tradition 
that ignore the "political, economic, historical and cultural context in which people 
live, "30 or that "ignore governance norms which underlie seemingly private areas 
of the law. "31 
Despite all of these potential shortcomings, I believe that the process of substan-
tive unification (and harmonization) should continue. I do not mean to exalt the 
24 For a Canadian example, see Boodman, supra note 19. 
25 Tebbens, supra note 21, at 62. 
1b Boodman, supra note 19, at 708. 
17 This feature marks a significant difference between the 1964 Uniform Law for International Sales 
and the CISG (Article 7(2)) provides that "[q]uestions concerning matters governed by this Convention 
which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on 
which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue 
of the rules of private international law. "). 
28 Hein Kbtz, Rechtsl'ereinheitlichung: Nutzen, Methoden, Ziele, 50 RABELSZ 1 (1986) (describing 
the morass of rules as a "Hydra"). 
29 Arthur Rosett, Critical Reflections on the UN Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods. 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 265 (1984). See also Peter Behrens, Voraussetzungen und Grenzen 
der Rechtsfortbildung durch Rechtswreinheitlichung, 50 RABELSZ 19 (1986). 
30 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to International 
Law, 85 AJIL 613 (1991). 
31 Project of Spencer W. Waller & Joel Reidenberg, discussed in ASIL International Economic 
Law Interest Group Newsletter, Fall 1992, at 3. 
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universality of principles of law. I do, however, believe that substantial common 
ground exists, and that it behooves us to search for these similarities, especially 
at such a time as this, when the temptation to colonize is great. In this way, we 
develop a common language, and build a foundation upon which later cooperation 
can be based. We counteract, or at least minimize, the polarization that divides 
us. And let it not be forgotten that unification (or harmonization) can be a device 
to increase rather than reduce the level of protection afforded in a particular conM 
text.32 Viewed only in this light, uniformity sounds pretty harmless. 
PIL devices to unify or harmonize substantive law can serve useful purposes 
in international trade, provided that their limitations are known and properly reM 
spected. The timeworn arguments cited in favor of efforts to achieve unification 
still carry some weight: to facilitate trade by removing impediments; to promote 
fairness by providing a modern, streamlined, neutral set of rules that parties can 
choose; and to facilitate the process of negotiation and alleviate the complexity 
of transnational dispute resolution by ensuring a higher degree of predictability. 
Indeed, some of these same justifications are being heard again in connection with 
the EC's incremental movement toward a common civil code of obligations for 
matters affecting economic life. Yet we have come a long way from the conviction 
that unification of law represents "the most important contribution which lawyers 
can make in the field of private law to the creation of a more harmonious and 
fraternal world. "33 
The modern skepticism of the value of PIL conventions is healthy and should 
be channeled into improving the focus and functioning of the process. The focus 
should be on identifying truly problematic issues, particularly those that lie beyond 
the realm of parties' contractual autonomy. 34 Despite the traditional reluctance 
to search for common ground in areas where "mandatory" or "imperative" local 
law is implicated, history is full of examples of creeping consensus in previously 
taboo areas. Nations have increasingly recognized that the needs of international 
commerce can outweigh their traditional concerns over public policy, and have 
worked toward unification in areas-such as formation of contract, prescription 
and property law-that were once viewed as too complex or controversial to lend 
themselves to unification. Who would have predicted, twenty years ago, the EC's 
current movement toward international standards for the protection of consumers? 
At the very least, we need to reexamine our traditional anxiety in areas where an 
international standard would further serve goals. 
Lest the process be hobbled by its limitations, we need also to pay closer attenM 
tion to the functioning ofPIL conventions. The most intractable problems concern 
32 See, e.g., Article IOOA (3) of the EEC Treaty, which provides that the Commission shall take as 
a base a "high level of protection" in the approximation oflaws concerning health and safety (including 
consumer and environmental protection). Article I00A (4) adds that EC member states maintaining 
an even more protective standard than the "high" level do not have to take a step down. See also 
CISG Article 14(1), (providing that an offer is too indefinite unless it "expressly or implicitly fixes or 
makes provision for determining the •.. price"). This provision appears to raise the prohibition against 
open-price terms, found in the laws of some countries, to the level of an international norm. 
33 See Andre Tunc's commentary on the 1964 Hague Conventions on International Sale of Goods 
and the Formation of the Contract of Sale in DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE UNIFICATION OF LAW 
GOVERNING THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (Records), The Hague 355 (1966). 
34 Ernst Rabel, Observations on the Utility of Unifying {the1 Law of Sale from the Standpoint of 
the Needs of International Commerce (1929), in LEAGUE OF NATIONS: DRAFT OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF THE SALE OF GOODS 123, 128, 131 (1935). 
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the nexus between the international uniform law and the various domestic laws 
it supplements or supplants. Since most PIL conventions are of limited scope, 
there is a point at which autonomous interpretation of its terms-necessary to 
achieve the desired uniform application-must yield to the conflict oflaws. Schol-
ars wrangle over how to ascertain this point. The validity exception to the CISG 
provides an apt example.35 Some would blur the interface by requiring autono-
mous, that is, uniform interpretation ofthe meaning of validity , based on a compar-
ative law analysis inspired by the work of Rabel, while others argue that the power 
to define the parameters of scope provisions such as Article 4(a) CISG-which 
by their nature delimit the area of local sovereignty to be preserved-must lie 
with the local jurisdiction. In my view, the integrity of the unification process 
requires scrupulous respect for provisions, such as Article 4(a) CISG, designed 
to preserve the applicability of some local rules rooted in public policy. N everthe-
less, a tribunal called upon to decide whether a particular contractual issue is one 
of validity that is governed by domestic law rather than the uniform rules of the 
CISG should exercise full caution.36 
Further attention should be paid, in the process of unifying (and harmonizing) 
substantive law, to providing adequate conflict oflaws provisions. Current debate 
within the EC illustrates the problems of overlapping and ill-fitting sets of rules 
and suggests that completion of the internal market is likely to enhance rather 
than diminish the role of conflict of laws, since "certain divergencies in national 
law are allowed to remain and even become greater in areas where the Member 
States have retained the power to determine their own level oflegal protection. "37 
This suggests that "where a substantive unification is not fully achieved, a com-
mon approach to the problem of how to allocate legal situations having connections 
with several units composing the market" becomes a prerequisite to equal compe-
tition throughout the internal market. 38 There is a strong call within the EC for 
converging, if not identical, conflict rules. While a detailed discussion of these 
proposals is beyond the scope of this paper, it bears mention that some EC enact-
ments contain choice-of-Iaw rules that range from straightforward39 to detailed 
and highly complex,40 while others contain practically no such provisions.41 Both 
within and beyond the horizons of the EC, it is imperative that unifying or harmo-
J5 The case law of the European Court of Justice under the Brussels Convention also wrestles with 
this issue on a case-by-case basis. See Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG, 1 C.M.L.R. 26, 
51-52 (1977): "The question therefore arises whether these words and concepts must be regarded as 
having their own independent meaning and as being thus common to all the member-States or as 
referring to substantive rules of the law applicable in each case under the rules of conflict of laws of 
the court before which the matter is first brought." 
J6This analysis is developed in Helen Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception 
to the COnl'ention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1993). 
J7Tebbens, supra note 21, at 51-52. 
JK Id. at 67-68. 
W E.g .• Regulation No. 2137/85 creating the European Economic Interest Group, 1985 O.J. (L 199) 
at I (Article 2(1)). 
40 E.g .• Directive 88/357 of 22 June 1988 on non-life insurance, 1988 O.J. (L 172) at 1 (renvoi to 
each member state's choice-of-Iaw rules to determine the permissible extent of party autonomy and 
the impact of mandatory rules of certain connected laws other than the law designated by the uniform 
rules). 
41 Tebbens. supra note 21, at 52 (noting that some recent directives "do not contain scope rules 
defining their own international applicability, nor do they indicate, when referring certain issues to 
'national law,' how that law is to be selected"). 
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nizing enactments respect the already existing framework of internationally appli-
cable choice-of-Iaw rules.42 
Finally, we need to acknowledge that the concept of public policy is an evolving 
one, in private as well as in public international law (jus cogens). "Public policy" 
is traditionally resorted to "on the basis of central and fundamental legal princi-
ples, values or interests of the State involved, to ward off the results of application 
offoreign law."43 Yet, in the public international law arena, the notion of sup ran a-
tional fundamental rights or principles is steadily gaining ground.44 This trend is 
also well established in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice.4s It 
is ironic that the doctrine of ordre public can simultaneously serve the goals of 
both universalism and particularism. Already within the EC, there is a growing 
recognition that the concept of ordre public is no longer limited to national but 
must also accommodate the "ordre public communautaire."46 Indeed, many 
scholars expect that the European Court will "review the way in which national 
courts make use of the public policy exception" under the Brussels Convention,47 
while others would deny this competence to the European Court. According to 
Jessurun d'Oliveira, "[p]ublic policy is an autonomous concept, which may be 
interpreted independently from the insights of national judges by the European 
Court. "48 These developments suggest that a similar evolution may gradually 
occur within the broader framework of other regional or global PIL efforts, al-
though certainly not to the same extent as is likely to be achieved within the 
EC. We might start by fostering the development of supranational principles of 
contractual fairness to govern international commercial transactions. 
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